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ABSTRACT  
    
 
MEASURING THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL REGULATION ON OUTPUT 
VOLATILITY DURING THE 2008 GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
    By      Andre Kaspar Warken 
 
 The offset of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis rekindled the discussion on the role financial regulation must play in preventing such events. Traditionally, it is believed financial liberalization is correlated with higher growth rates, at the cost of increased instability of the whole system. The literature asserts the existence of an effect of finance on growth, as well as its part on the deflagration of the aforementioned crisis. Based on regulatory data collected by the World Bank, I conducted regression analysis of regulatory variables on growth. Although results are limited due to missing data, a statistically and economically significant relationship between financial industry conglomeration, loose capital requirements and increased growth volatility has been found. Also of note is the fact that no meaningful relationship was found between these indicators and growth itself: in the present study, liberalization in the regulatory areas under investigation does not amplify growth, while increasing systemic instability. Hence, there appears to be no tradeoff, meaning that a stricter approach is generally recommended. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The 2007--‐2008 financial meltdown ground the world economy to a halt, 
accentuated by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and still has its ripples felt during the 
current European debt catastrophe. This calamity, not in small part caused by the actions of 
financial actors, rekindled the discussion on financial regulation: could stricter regulation 
have prevented the crisis, or, at least, measurably impacted its effects? 
Conventional economic wisdom states that growth and liberalization go hand in hand: 
economies whose financial sectors are freer are expected to exhibit higher growth rates. There 
is some empirical evidence that only private monitoring, and not strict government regulation 
and intervention in areas such as capital requirements or separation of financial and non--‐
financial activities, lead to increased financial system stability and efficiency. It does not tell 
us, however, how it affects the economy as a whole or how stable this growth is. Although 
there might be a positive relationship between financial liberalization and growth, we suggest 
that this comes at the expense of increased risk exposure for the whole economy. 
 I tentatively propose that, while liberalization might lead to higher long--‐term growth, 
it is achieved through a bumpy road. Adopting stricter regulatory policies in key sectors might, 
indeed, not lead to such large numbers, but, on the other hand, it could lead to an overall trend 
of much lower fluctuation, presumably paving the road for smoother growth. Thus the 
question is: where should policymakers stand in this possible trade--‐off? The first step here is a 
review of the literature concerning the linkage of financial regulation and growth, by showing 
the main objectives of financial systems and how regulation affects reaching them. While 
there isn’t a theoretical consensus on the existence of a positive relationship, recent empirical 
findings provide evidence of causality, even when controlling for simultaneity bias, under the 
explanation of easing external financing constraints on industrial growth.  
Next is a review of reports on how financial regulatory policy helped shape the 
deflagration of the crisis. Throughout the decade before the crisis, and perhaps even earlier 
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than that, policymakers acted to loosen regulations and curtail supervisory powers, which 
caused financial agents to increase risk--‐taking, expanding short--‐term profits but 
compromising the long--‐term stability of not only their institutions, but of the whole economy. 
 I then set out to explore the existence of a relationship between growth fluctuation 
and financial regulation using data collected from surveys conducted by the World Bank over 
the last 15 years, as well as growth rate data made available by the same institution. Although 
it was not possible to include all regulatory indicators surveyed due to the incompleteness of 
the dataset, since participation was voluntary, a statistically and economically significant 
relationship between financial industry conglomeration, loose capital requirements and 
increased growth volatility is apparent. It is also of note that I was not able to find a relevant 
relationship between these indicators and growth itself; that is, stricter regulation in this area 
does not seem to hamper growth. I used deductive reasoning to fit the conclusion of the 
generalized analysis of the regression output to specific countries and give them policy 
considerations. While analyzing the breakdown of the financial regulation system in the 
United States we also use inductive reasoning to derive general advice applicable to other 
economies. 
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2.  Literature    Review    
2.1 Financial Regulation as a Factor of Growth  
The impact of the structure of the financial sector of an economy on its growth 
prospects has been a subject of contention in the traditional literature, despite some advances 
on its research, especially during the last couple of decades. According to Levine, 
Finance is not even discussed in a collection of essays by the “pioneers of 
development economics” (Meier and Seers, 1984), including three Nobel Prize winners, and 
Nobel Laureate Robert Lucas (1988, p.6) dismisses finance as an “over--‐stressed” determinant 
of economic growth. Joan Robinson (1952, p. 86) famously argued that "where enterprise 
leads finance follows." From this perspective, finance does not cause growth; finance responds 
to changing demands from the “real sector.” At the other extreme, Nobel Laureate Merton 
Miller (1988, p.14) argues that, “[the idea] that financial markets contribute to economic 
growth is a proposition too obvious for serious discussion.” Drawing a more restrained 
conclusion, Bagehot (1873), Schumpeter (1912), Gurley and Shaw (1955), Goldsmith (1969), 
and McKinnon (1973) reject the idea that the finance--‐growth nexus can be safely ignored 
without substantially limiting our understanding of economic growth.1 
The main function of financial systems is to improve information asymmetries, 
between investors and companies, managers and the board of directors, insiders and outsiders. 
Levine establishes five main objectives of a functioning financial system: (a) providing 
information about future investments; (b) monitoring the use of these resources; (c) curtailing 
risk through diversification; (d) efficient allocation of savings; and (e) facilitating trade.2 
Since the economy is so complex, it is unfeasible for investors to collect enough information on 
all available investment opportunities. Hence, there is an opportunity for intermediaries who 
collect and analyze such information to rise, leading to a better allocation of capital and 
increased efficiency of markets. 
1 Ross Levine, Working Paper No. 10766, National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2004, 1. 
2 Ibid., 6. 
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              In a market with many small shareholders, high costs of monitoring might keep them 
from effective policing whether the actions of management truly pursue their best interest by 
seeking value maximization. Due to high cost and complexity, a form of the free--‐rider problem 
might ensue, as shareholders take no action, expecting others to do so, leading to insufficient 
supervision. A well--‐functioning stock market can ameliorate this, as intermediaries pool 
resources from investors and save on supervision costs due to economies of scale. 
People are generally risk--‐averse. However, higher--‐return investments tend to have 
higher risk. Financial systems help allocate capital in a more efficient manner, finding the 
highest return projects compatible with investors’ risk profiles and increasing overall returns 
at an investor’s preferred risk exposure level through diversification. This is called cross--‐
sectional risk sharing. Markets also offer inter--‐ temporal and liquidity risk sharing. The former 
refers to the smoothing of investment patterns, where long--‐lived intermediaries can help share 
risks such as macroeconomic shocks, which affect the whole economy at a single point in 
time, throughout a longer time scale, providing yet another form of diversification. The latter, 
on the other hand, is related to the speed of conversion of assets into money; some projects 
may require long--‐term investment, longer--‐term than most investors would be comfortable 
being separated from parts of their holdings. 
 Financial intermediation can improve that by allowing investors to freely trade their 
positions through financial instruments, increasing the liquidity thereof, thereby making 
investors more comfortable and confident in investing in long--‐term projects. The allocation of 
savings into investments is also an important function of the financial sector. This can be 
divided into two steps: minimizing the costs of pooling resources from numerous investors; 
and assuring them of the safety of trusting their resources to third parties. Although this can 
happen privately between parties (such as in a partnership or a non--‐traded company), due to 
friction costs, intermediaries provide a net benefit.  
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By pooling resources, they can make investment in a scale impossible to individual 
investors due to either indivisible costs or very high economies of scale possible. 
Intermediation also makes it possible for investors to hold a smaller stake in many different 
projects, increasing risk diversification across all kinds of savers, which has positive effects on 
economic growth. The financial system facilitates the trading of goods, by making 
specialization feasible, and fomenting technological breakthroughs. Specialization implies a 
larger number of transactions, due to the relationships carried between producers of each 
different, specialized part of a larger product.  
Therefore, a system that lowers transaction costs foments increased specialization in 
the overall economy. It also reduces information costs related to the pricing of goods. Such 
costs are likely to keep dropping on the long term due to financial innovation. Finally, 
empirical tests have shown evidence of existence of a link between the state of the financial 
environment in a nation and economic growth. Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) demonstrated 
evidence of causality between finance and growth, even when controlling for simultaneity 
bias. Moreover, they also found a relationship between the characteristics of the supervisory 
and legal systems and the development of the financial sector. 
 Rajan and Zingales (1998) went further and brought empirical evidence to one of 
the possible theoretical explanations to the causal relationship between finance and growth, by 
showing that industries heavily reliant on external financing for their operations presented 
larger growth where the financial system was further developed. Arcand, Berkes and Panizza 
(2012) show that there is a statistically significant relationship between capital regulations and 
growth, especially in economies with well--‐ developed financial sectors. While financial 
development seems to be positively correlated with economic growth in countries with small 
financial sectors, there is a point over which financial depth has negative effects on growth. 
The point where this reversion takes place coincides with where in previous analyses financial 
development started increasing macroeconomic instability. 
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2.2 Financial Regulation as a cause of the 2007--‐2008 economic crisis 
 
 
The direct causes of the crisis were an unsustainable asset price bubble that started 
with the American housing market, a credit boom that led to an excessive debt load to 
borrowers and the spread of low--‐quality loans, and a failure of financial regulation. House 
prices rose upwards of 30% a year on the years previous to the crisis. The core issue of 
regulatory failure was a problem of distorted incentives in the financial regulation frameworks 
that led to increased risk--‐taking in response to moral hazard issues. The increasing complexity 
of the supervisory system decreased the transparency of institutions and made it much more 
difficult for resource--‐constrained regulators to oversee them. The speed with which the crisis 
spread from the mortgage sector to other securities markets revealed how hard it was to 
measure risk, and who was exposed to it, in consequence of the adoption of novel, 
unregulated financial instruments caused by increased rigidity only in part of the activities of 
the financial industry. The World Bank 2013 Global Financial Development Report states that 
these issues were exacerbated in the countries where the crisis originated. 
Levine claims that the 2007--‐8 meltdown wasn’t merely caused by the burst of the 
American housing bubble, and neither exclusively by the introduction of ever--‐more--‐ complex 
financial instruments that left even their operators dumbfounded, but also by conscious policy 
decisions from key government institutions that eroded the country’s financial regulatory 
framework, which had global repercussions.6  
 
 
 
 
 
6 Ross Levine, An autopsy of the US financial system: accident, suicide, or negligent homicide, Journal of Financial 
Economic Policy, 2 --‐   3. 3, 2010, 196--‐213.  
7 Barry Eichengreen 2012, p. 182. 
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This is the culmination of a larger belief in the sanctity of the freedom of the markets 
and in the government as a mere hindrance that led to a long--‐term process of deregulation that 
started with the Reagan administration.7 Against this backdrop of lax supervision, financial 
institutions proceeded to profit immensely from extremely risky businesses that increased the 
fragility of the whole system, leading to its eventual failure. Analyzing the policies adopted by 
U.S. regulatory agencies, he points to the directives that contributed to the set--‐off of the crisis. 
The Securities Exchange Commission contributed with its policies regarding the supervision 
of credit rating agencies, investment banks and over--‐the--‐counter (OTC) derivatives; the 
Federal Reserve, by authorizing banks to use Credit Default Swaps as capital reserves, leading 
them to displace other assets, decreasing their holdings of money, and also through its policies 
towards OTC derivatives; and the federal government through its policies regarding Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, the state--‐sponsored home financing agencies. 
The incentive distortion was not exclusive to the US: it spread over to the rest of 
the world through the adoption of the Basel protocols. This principle of capital requirements 
by credit ratings and internal models for larger institutions spread throughout the world via 
the adoption of the Basel II protocols as response to the increased securitization caused by 
the adoption of Basel I, due to the lower capital charges it assigned to securities in 
comparison to loans. External ratings are not the best available determinant of reserve 
capital requirements: ratings measure expected losses, while reserve capital is a stronghold 
against unexpected losses. These measures were considered to misrepresent the solvency of 
banks, contributing to systemic risk. 
 The countries most affected by the crisis had more liberal definitions of capital 
and were twice as likely to allow banks to model their own credit risk, with obvious moral 
hazard implications. Since 1975, risk assessment by credit rating agencies is one of the 
requisites for determining capital requirements for institutions regulated by the SEC, which 
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led to a considerable increase in the demand for credit ratings. Since the analyzed institutions 
pay for their own ratings, there is a clear conflict of interest for the rating agencies: positive 
rankings mean repeat business, as better--‐regarded securities command higher prices. As the 
ratings segment is strictly regulated and there are ample barriers to entry, institutions felt 
comfortable giving out inflated ratings at the cost of their long--‐term credibility. This 
situation was exacerbated by the introduction of highly complex derivative products that 
required the rating of numerous underlying assets, as well as the final product itself, meaning 
a new, hugely profitable revenue stream for rating agencies. There is evidence of pressure 
from clients being able to change the preliminary ratings issued to more favorable ones. 
Even though regulators were aware of this situation, they did nothing to combat it. 
Puzzlingly, the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act explicitly prohibited the SEC from 
auditing the methods used for assigning ratings. 
The next piece of regulation to take part on the setup of the meltdown was the 
authorization by the Federal Reserve to allow banks to use Credit Default Swaps as 
replacement for reserve deposits in 1996. These instruments are similar to insurance policies, 
where the seller guarantees payment in case the counterparty of the underlying contract 
defaults. Despite the similarities, they are not, however, insurance contracts; unlike insurance, 
there is no specific regulatory legislation concerning this kind of swap. None of the parties of 
this kind of derivative contract are required to be a party to the underlying contract; the risk 
exposure of the transaction was not based on the risk of the principal, but that of the seller; 
thus, no matter how risky the underlying contract, as long as the seller of the derivative had 
good reputation, it would receive a good rating. The Fed’s decision allowed banks to 
reallocate reserve capital and invest it into riskier, but more lucrative assets by merely 
purchasing CDSs on them.  
However, due to their unregulated nature, it could be difficult to exactly determine 
the party liable for compensating in one of these contracts; also, some of them had huge 
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exposures, most notably AIG, having close to 100 billion dollars in reserves for all its 
businesses, had a exposure to around US$500 billion in derivatives. This was exacerbated by 
the fact that, due to the tightening of its monetary policy the Fed took starting 2004, banks 
sought opportunities for asset growth, which ended up being mainly subprime and alt--‐A 
mortgages. Even though these issues were widely known, and regulators were aware of them, 
according to internal Fed documents, they did not try to limit this sort of exposure. Even 
though the Fed is not responsible for regulating capital markets, one of its duties is 
maintaining the stability of the banking system, which could have been helped by increasing 
capital reserve requirements. This is corroborated by an increase, in this period, in risk--‐
weighted assets that was much higher than the increase in total assets, implying a regulatory 
failure in capturing this increased risk of leveraging. 
The SEC’s policies in relation to investment banks also contributed to the 
development of the crisis. In 2004, the commission waived the major investment banks from 
the net capital rule, allowing them to use internal risk models to determine the capital levels 
they would need to hold themselves. This caused a dramatic rise in leveraging, meaning that 
the banks could invest much more in riskier ventures without having to put a comparable 
amount of their own capital on the line. Another policy change was acquiescing to lobbying 
on the part of the banks for them to become Consolidated Supervised Entities, which made 
the SEC responsible for supervising the whole firm, including even unregulated businesses 
(as, for instance, some of the derivative trading) and foreign partners.  
Due to the sheer complexity of this proposition, as well as understaffing (there were 
only seven analysts responsible for supervising all these companies, which held more than 
US$ 4 billion in assets), it’s no wonder that not a single inspection of these new entities was 
completed, which also fostered increased risk taking by the banks. The Federal Government 
contributed through its policies to foster home ownership. Through the Congressionally--‐
chartered Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) and Fannie Mae (Federal 
10  
National Mortgage Association) the government intended to reduce the cost of home 
financing by making the mortgage market more liquid. These Government--‐Sponsored 
Entities would purchase home loans from banks, package and guarantee them, and sell them 
on the market to investors as mortgage--‐backed securities. Since these entities were 
government--‐founded, investors assumed they were backed by the Treasury, should they fail 
to honor their commitments. They were also incentivized to increase the activity in the 
mortgage market, as it would further enhance their profits. Their semi--‐governmental status 
ensured low interest rates for them to borrow, regardless of the risk level of their mortgages, 
which they could use to buy even more high--‐return mortgages. 
In order to expand the reach of housing programs, the federal government pushed 
them to increase lending to disadvantaged areas and low--‐income families through the 
Community Reinvestment Act and a general policy push for affordable housing. This 
pressured the entities to loosen their financing standards, causing them to lend to more riskier 
borrowers than before. Between 2005 and 2007, 45% of their mortgage purchases could be 
classified as subprime, which lead to a boom of low--‐ quality, high--‐risk mortgages, especially 
since issuers were certain that Fannie and Freddie would purchase them and bear all the risk. 
Since these policies were popular with voters and both agencies were large campaign 
contributors, Congress was quite comfortable with not interfering with the ever--‐increasing 
destabilization of the mortgage market. Despite their status as semi--‐governmental entities, the 
agencies provided campaign funding to Congress in order to protect their soaring profits from 
meddling regulators, who already in 2000 were throwing allegations of accounting fraud. 
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3.  Data    Presentation and   Methodology    
 
I decided on OLS multiple linear regressions as the tool to be used in the present 
analysis. As it is the simpler method of showing the relationships between indicators. 
Analysis was conducted on cross--‐country data, based on availability. In total, the sample was 
comprised of data on 89 countries; the full list thereof indicated on table V. Information on all 
sizes of economies was available, which enables the discussion of the effects of regulation on 
output fluctuation across the board. Economic data was taken from the World Bank database. 
Economic growth was measured through yearly Gross Domestic Product growth, expressed as 
a percentage change related to the previous year, thus enabling us to see the change in a way 
that allows comparison between different economies, unrelated to their respective size. 
 Since each survey covers a multi--‐year period, it was necessary to find a way to 
combine this yearly information in a way that can be related to the entire interval under each 
survey. I have arrived at two transformations of interest: the geometric average of growth 
during the period, and the corresponding standard deviation. The geometric average was 
chosen because it more accurately covers the effect of compounding sequential growth 
periods, which tends to produce overstated results under the arithmetic mean. The standard 
deviation, on the other hand, is used to convey how much fluctuation there was inside that 
period: the higher the deviation, the bumpier the growth in that observation. As a potential 
control variable the real GDP per capita of each economy at the beginning of each surveyed 
period was included, this allows controlling for convergence. The real value indicator was 
chosen as growth rate information is also based on real GDP values. Regulation data was 
extracted from the database compiled by Barth, Caprio and Levine,15  based on surveys 
conducted by the World Bank, as well as data collected from the Journal of Financial 
Intermediation. 
15 James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr., and Ross Levine. 2013. "Bank Regulation and Supervision in 180 Countries from 1999 
to 2011." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 18733. Accessed January 15, 2013. http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ross_levine/Papers/Copy%20of%20BCL_Sup_Reg_Dat a_13JAN2013.xls, 
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 Surveys were conducted in 2000, 2003, 2007 and 2011, which is of clear value, 
as it paints a picture of the regulatory environment in each of the participating countries 
before, during, and after the crisis. Participation was voluntary, however, meaning that 
it’s not a cross--‐country analysis of the whole globe that’s being conducted, rather, a 
sample of the world’s financial regulatory context during this period, which nonetheless 
can bring valuable insight on the role supervision might have played on the deflagration, 
control and recovery from the crisis. Besides the valuable work done on collecting such a 
large amount of information, a very important part of this data was expressing the 
qualitative answers to the different kinds of questions present on the survey as useful 
quantitative data. In order to use, and more importantly understand, what this database 
contains, a carefully study of what each index conveys and what the information included 
therein is must be conducted. Although the indices are focused on the banking sector of 
the financial industry, some indicators can shed light on the entire financial sector, such as 
the ones pertaining to concentration of activities under a single entity and concentration of 
ownership of different kinds of institutions. 
The voluntary nature of participation in this survey meant that not all countries 
provided answers, and even those who did, did not answer all questions and took part in all 
periods. In fact, there are only 9 complete observations in the entire dataset. This is clearly 
not enough to conduct any kind of worthwhile analysis, hence a compromise between 
completeness and volume of observations had to be found. Because of this, I decided to 
focus on a small number of variables that allowed the study of the whole financial sector, 
and not merely supervision of the banking sector. The process for selection is described in 
the following section. The dataset is divided into ten different sections, each concerned with 
a different aspect of financial regulation. Even inside each section, indices might contain 
different measurements, requiring separate and careful measurement.  
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Table VI contains a brief description of all the indices. In this text, I’ll focus on 
observing overarching trends and take a closer look into a few measurements of interest 
during the crisis period (2007--‐2010). For an in--‐depth explanation and analysis on the indices, 
refer to Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001, 2006, 2008) and Čihák, Demirgüç--‐Kunt, et.al. 
(2012). There is no clear trend in regulatory policy throughout the decade. In regards to 
separation of different segments of the financial sector, there has been a movement in the 
direction of liberalization of miscegenation between the banking, securities, and insurance 
and real estate activities. Foreign participation does not seem to be a threat to the financial 
system under the eyes of the regulators, there being a trend of liberalization of foreign 
participation in the banking system. 
 All indices were on average at their highest before and during the crisis, on the 
period between 2007 and 2010, and went lower in the subsequent period, that is, the 
response to the crisis seemingly did not cause regulators to become more stringent in this 
aspect, but more lenient. The same did not happen when it comes to the separation of 
ownership, however: there was a push for stricter separation between the financial and non--‐
financial sectors of the economy, as well as between different parts of the financial industry 
itself. Requirements for entry and the definition of capital assets have likewise gotten stricter. 
It appears that regulators and policymakers have focused on these aspects of regulation as 
fundamental to maintain stability of the financial system. Regulators seem to have gained 
more power and independence, as well. Supervisors have been given on average a 
significantly higher amount of discretion to take swift action when a potential failing has 
been observed.  
They also seem to have been granted more discretion on whether to act or not when 
an irregularity has been detected, which is not completely a positive development, since, as 
remarked on the previous section, American regulators chose not to interfere in the market 
until the situation was unsustainable. During the crisis period, most countries freely allowed 
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the mixing of commercial banking and securities activities. Only 11 countries of the 138 
surveyed kept them completely separated: Belize, Botswana, China, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Guyana, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan and Thailand. The 
United States placed no restrictions on the breadth of operations, only requiring that part of 
them to be conducted through subsidiaries. In regards to the separation of banking and 
insurance, the absolute majority of countries placed restrictions or outright forbade them, 
including the United States; only the United Kingdom and Hong Kong are fully liberalized 
in this respect. The situation is very similar when it comes to real estate investment and 
development; only the following regions allow its mingling with banking: Algeria, Aruba, 
Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, Ireland, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Liechtenstein, Macedonia FYR, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Suriname, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
In regards to conglomeration both inside the financial sector and between financial 
and non--‐financial firms, most countries have at least some restrictions in place. Only the 
Cayman Islands, Mexico and New Zealand freely allow cross--‐ownership between financial 
and non--‐financial firms. They also freely allow conglomeration between financial and non--‐
financial firms, in which they’re joined by Belarus, Belgium, Cambodia, Cameroon, the 
Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, 
Gabon, Maldives and Morocco. On the opposite side of the spectrum, Algeria, Bolivia, 
Colombia, El Salvador and Nicaragua completely forbid cross--‐ control between the financial 
and non--‐financial sectors. More countries prevent concentration of different segments of the 
financial segment: Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Colombia, Fiji, Jamaica, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Seychelles and Suriname. 
 Most countries have a very strict risk weighting of capital requirements, in 
accordance to Basel II regulations. The following have very lax definitions: Aruba, Belgium, 
Canada, Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ireland, Lithuania, Mozambique, Seychelles and 
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the Slovak Republic. When measuring capital asset definitions, most countries are strict. The 
ones with very lax definitions (rather, that accept a larger variety of assets as reserves) are: 
Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, 
Ireland, Israel, Macedonia FYR, Morocco, Mozambique, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. Financial regulators are granted wide powers of 
supervision in most countries. Even in countries where their actions are subdued, they’re still 
granted relatively large privileges. The countries that restrict the actions of supervisors the 
most are Bhutan, Botswana, Canada and Suriname. 
 On the other hand, in the following regions they have been granted practically the 
full range of powers measured in this index: Belize, Brazil, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, 
Switzerland, Uganda and the United States. Most countries allow regulation a very large 
amount of discretion on using these powers on seemingly failing institutions. The countries 
with the strictest conduct legislations are: Algeria, Israel, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, 
Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The United States is amongst those that grant 
their supervisors with the largest amount of discretion. As seen on the previous section, it 
wasn’t that the supervisory structure had its hands tied on dealing with the increasing 
complexity and undermining of the whole financial system that contributed to the moral 
hazard issues that set off the crisis, but that they actively chose not to interfere in the market. 
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4.  Results    
 
 
4.1 Balancing the trade--‐off between the number of explanatory variables 
and observations 
The first difficulty when working with this dataset was the amount of missing 
values. In fact, there are only 9 complete observations in regards to regulatory data, 
throughout all four surveyed periods, which is definitely not enough to conduct worthwhile 
analysis. I had thus to discover a way of balancing the tradeoff between having a valuable 
number of variables for analysis and having enough observations so that econometric 
analysis would provide insightful results. Automated methods of variable selection such as 
stepwise selection were not used as the different number of observations in each test would 
not lead to consistent results to be used in specification tests. 
For the initial analysis, I focused on the standard deviation of growth as the 
 
response variable, since the main interest on the present research lays on figuring out 
whether there is any significant relationship between how strict financial regulation is (or, 
conversely, how liberalized the sector is) and the degree of economic output fluctuation, 
how smooth or bumpy it is. It is assumed that, although liberalization does indeed seem to 
lead to higher growth, this growth comes at the expense of increased risk and instability in 
the system, which would result in a larger fluctuation of output, due to subsequent, 
intermittent recessions, while countries under stricter regulatory systems might achieve 
lower overall growth, but since they are exposed to less risk, their economies are more stable, 
hence there should be less variation in output compared to the former case. 
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In order to narrow down the possible variables of interest, a series of simple 
regressions of each regulatory indicator on the standard deviation of growth followed, and 
those that by themselves produced coefficients statistically significantly different from zero 
were selected. Initial GDP per capita was not used as a control variable at this step, since the  
size of output has no significant role in how regulation could affect its fluctuation in this 
model. Since the focus is on the role of regulation under the crisis, analysis was conducted for 
the period covering the years 2007 to 2010 in this step. Concentrating on a single period 
allowed the use of pure cross--‐country regression analysis, conveniently avoiding having to 
figure out country--‐specific effects and autocorrelation over time, due to the relatively short 
period data is available for, as well as the incompleteness of the data set. The model 
considers regulation to be exogenously determined, so the dependent variable was formed 
from data collected from the year the respective survey was published (in this case, 2007) up 
to but not including the year of publication of the following questionnaire (2011). The 
following results were obtained: 
 
Dependent'variable Independent'variable Coefficient  T4value P4value R^2 
GDP.Growth.StdDev secur_act .0.2285 .2.5427 0.0122 0.0481 
GDP.Growth.StdDev own_firm .0.2697 .3.6809 0.0003 0.0925 
GDP.Growth.StdDev Nonbankfin_own_bank .0.2804 .3.3875 0.0009 0.0817 
GDP.Growth.StdDev Overall_restrict .0.1323 .3.3524 0.0011 0.0831 
GDP.Growth.StdDev ovr_cap_string .0.2176 .3.1082 0.0030 0.1494 
GDP.Growth.StdDev cap_reg .0.1706 .2.4714 0.0166 0.1000 
GDP.Growth.StdDev Court_Involve 0.3241 2.5839 0.0109 0.0492 
 
 
All indicators seem to behave consistently with our expectations: higher values of 
the independent variables mean stricter regulations in those areas, so the negative correlation 
with the dependent variable is interpreted as the tighter the regulation, the lower the 
fluctuation in growth; or, conversely, that liberalization in these areas are correlated to higher 
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fluctuations in output. The only exception is court_involve, where interpretation is reversed: 
higher values mean less independence from a priori judicial decisions; in other words, 
regulators have less power to act independently. Before proceeding with any further 
econometric analysis, it should be noted that some aggregate variables and also their 
components are included, namely own_firm, nonbankfin_own_bank and overall_restrict, as 
well as ovr_cap_string and cap_reg. In order to control if the inclusion of these aggregates is 
due only to their correlation to their included components, they have been in further analysis 
replaced by their missing components, firm_own_bank and init_cap_strin, respectively. 
 
 
4.2 Measuring the effect of regulation on output fluctuation 
 
 
In order to figure out the individual effect of each regulatory aspect on fluctuation, I 
then proceeded to run multiple regression analysis on the previously mentioned variables. 
After getting the preliminary results, we decided to drop the variable related to judicial 
involvement on bank supervision. First, because of the previously mentioned tradeoff due to 
missing values; second, because it was so far away from statistical significance under any 
reasonable significance level: its p--‐value was of 0.62, which was also much higher than that 
of any other explanatory variable, which was also corroborated by conducting F--‐testing 
between both regression specifications (Table IV); finally, it does not measure any direct 
aspect of regulation, rather, the relationship between regulatory agencies and the courts. 
Running a multiple OLS regression on the remaining explanatory variables 
provides results consistent with what was expected for all independent variables, except for 
firm_own_bank and init_cap_strin (Table I). However, since these coefficients are not 
statistically significantly different from zero in the 95% confidence interval I have chosen to 
operate under, this is not a cause for concern. 
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The first information I can extract from this analysis is that, independently from the 
aspects of regulation measured, there is a large expected fluctuation in output during this 
turbulent period. What we can also see is that, consistently with the preliminary hypothesis, 
there is a statistically significant, positive correlation between regulatory liberalization in 
regards to conglomeration of the financial sector and oscillations in growth. Economies that 
fully allow financial firms to control other financial firms are expected to have standard 
deviation of their growth rates more than three percentage points higher than others that 
forbid such concentration.  
Likewise, allowing cross--‐ownership between financial and non--‐financial firms also 
increase fluctuations by a similar amount. This is a significant amount, when seen under the 
light that the mean deviation was of 3.65 percentage points. Due to the key role that the 
failure of certain banks played on the deflagration of the crisis, it’s not surprising that capital 
adequacy rules also appear to have a significant effect on fluctuation. Once again, 
liberalization is correlated to higher volatility: here there is also an expected difference of 3 
percentage points between the extremes. After having evidence of a strong possible relation 
between these aspects of financial regulation and output volatility under the aforementioned 
crisis, I then checked whether this behavior also holds on other timeframes. None of the 
relevant explanatory factors are of statistical significance in explaining growth fluctuations 
during the previous periods, comparing unfavorably in explanatory power to an empty model. 
Since there is only growth rate data for a single year on the period following the crisis, as data 
for 2012 is not available as of yet, there is no way of measuring its standard deviation.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 With a single data point, the observation is equal to the mean; therefore deviation is always 
equal to zero. 
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4.3 Measuring the direct effect of regulation on growth 
 
 
In order to measure whether tighter regulation in these areas would hamper output 
growth as expected, the current model was then adjusted to have the average growth rate as 
the response variable, while also introducing initial GDP per capita in the period as a control, 
in order to check for economic convergence (Table II). Once more, no significant correlation 
was found in the pre--‐crisis periods. During the crisis, a statistically significant positive 
correlation only between liberalization of the kinds of assets used to inject capital in a bank 
and output growth emerges. None of the other observed variables seem to hold a statistically 
significant effect on output growth. This might be explained by the fact that allowing flexible 
capitalization to institutions in periods of instability might assist their recovery or prevent 
their failure. 
 
4.4 Multi--‐period analysis 
 
I also conducted panel data analysis on this model, using dummy variables to 
control for the specific effects of differing periods (Table III). Doing so enables checking the 
possibility for any sort of overarching trend throughout all the differing periods. In regards to 
the direct effects of regulation on growth rate, results are consistent with previous 
observations: none of the regulatory factors are significantly different from zero. When 
measuring the cross--‐period trend on volatility, however, new information arises: deregulation 
of securities activities and liberalization of capital adequacy directives are correlated with 
higher standard deviation of growth rates throughout all measured periods. 
Having these results at hand, I can infer that restrictive regulatory measures in 
 
regards to financial activity concentration and conglomeration both inside the financial sector 
and between the industry and non--‐financial entities do not seem to directly affect growth; 
opposing what common economic sense might say, tighter regulation, at least in these areas, 
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does not hamper economic performance. When it comes to their effect on volatility, however, 
there is strong evidence that keeping distinct areas of the financial industry apart leads to a 
smoother growth. Separating commercial banking and securities underwriting and sales 
appears to play a role on reducing fluctuations on output throughout all observed periods, 
even though its effect cannot be observed individually on the pre--‐crisis terms. 
When examining the crisis period specifically, other facets of regulation appear 
 
to be of relevance: keeping segments of the financial sector separate from each other and 
from other parts of the economy are now strongly associated with a significant reduction in 
instability, while once more not affecting growth itself negatively. Having stricter controls 
on the types of assets used to capitalize banks did, indeed, seem to hamper growth in this 
period, however. 
The most likely explanation for the effects observed seem to be that they prevent the 
issues of moral hazard and information asymmetry the literature alludes to, since it allows 
risk sharing between branches of the same company and use of information for private gain, 
while preventing others from assessing the real situation of the institution. 
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5.  Conclusion    
 
 
In the present paper, I set out to try to figure out the relationship between strictness 
of financial regulation and fluctuations of output growth. Although economic common sense 
and some empirical evidence point to the direction that strict regulation might hamper 
economic development, there has not been much analysis on how smoothly this progression 
presents itself. I started out under the hypothesis that, while it might be true that liberalization 
leads to faster growth, it is under the expense of increased risk, and, therefore, larger 
fluctuations in output. Even though there is not enough information available to study all the 
different facets of financial regulation included in the dataset I used to base my research, due 
to the tradeoff between the number of explanatory variables and sample size I had to balance, 
I was still able to successfully isolate some aspects that seem to have played a statistically 
and economically significant role on the oscillations of production during the crisis timeframe 
(2007--‐2010). 
 Preventing conglomeration between distinct sectors of the financial industry as well 
as their collusion with non--‐financial economic agents apparently has lead to more stable 
growth. The same is the case when discussing the rigidity of banking capital definitions and 
the classes of assets allowed in required reserves. For instance, I suppose that countries that 
do not allow mortgages to be part of an institution’s reserve capital have had fewer issues in 
comparison to those whose banks had toxic assets the worth thereof disappeared overnight 
when that bubble popped. This is not to say that other aspects of financial regulation are less 
relevant: selecting a few measures of interest was strictly a matter of pragmatism in order to 
have a relevant amount of data to conduct useful analysis. In opposition to the common sense, 
tighter rules in regard to these aspects did not hinder growth, either during the crisis period, or 
the previous periods, when analyzed individually. Stricter capital definitions were actually 
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correlated with larger growth in the crisis period. The lack of response from either growth or 
its standard deviation outside the crisis period seem to point to the fact that, at least in regards 
to the variables currently under analysis, there is no direct benefit to liberalization, which, 
should an external shock such as the one that started in 2007--‐2008 happen, appears to be 
correlated to a destabilization of the whole economy. This is not to say, however, that 
liberalization does not produce any positive outcomes: it’s possible it could lead to higher 
productivity inside the financial sector itself, at least until the instability it nurtures takes its 
toll on the larger economic panorama. 
Moreover, when assessing the effects of these variables on a longer--‐term basis, I 
have shown that they still do not seem to interfere with growth. Under this lens, stricter 
capital definition laws and separation of the banking and the security underwriting and 
trading industries seem to have a positive effect on smoothing output fluctuation. In 
accordance to what was shown in the literature review, allowing the consolidation of the 
different segments of the financial industry hampers efficient supervision, just as happened 
in the United States, where the introduction of Consolidated Financial Institutions made 
oversight all but impossible: no inspection took place between their introduction and the 
crisis. This now seems to be corroborated by empirical evidence, as I have shown that 
financial conglomeration is associated with increased output fluctuation.  
In conclusion, as a suggestion to policymakers, I can say that, under the light of the 
present analysis, I advise the adoption of regulation that maintains the separation between 
segments of the financial industry; that separates the ownership of financial and non--‐
financial institutions; and that institutes strict reserve capital definition and that clearly states 
its allowed constituting asset classes. Adopting these measures is a valuable precaution 
against external economic shocks with apparently no tradeoff in productivity. 
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APPENDIX    A: REGRESSION RESULTS    
 
TABLE    I:    STANDARD    DEVIATION    REGRESSION    RESULTS    
 
 
2007--- 
2010  
2000--- 
2002  
2003--- 
2006  
Constant 9.1698   --‐0.4559  2.8722 
(5.057)   (--‐0.272)  (1.529) 
secur_act  --‐0.5993    0.2136 --‐0.2725 
(--‐1.678) (0.746)   (--‐0.763) 
own_firm --‐1.0927 0.1148  0.2362 
(--‐2.220)     (0.335)  (0.638) 
firm_own_bank  0.5475   0.3409  --‐0.2687 
(1.137) (1.067)   (--‐0.505) 
Nonbankfin_own_bank.... --‐1.0989 0.6979  0.1199 
(--‐2.057)     (2.068)    (0.255) 
ovr_cap_string  --‐0.5504   0.1967  --‐0.2608      
(--‐2.495)       (1.207) (--‐1.482) 
init_cap_strin  0.7656  ---0.1169  0.3171 (1.764) (---0.367) (0.886) 
 
n 56 49 65 
Adjusted R^2 0.3394 0.0853 --‐0.0072 
F--‐t.p--‐value 0.0001465 0.1342 0.4848 
 
 
 
Numbers in parenthesis are t--‐values; bolded numbers indicate statistical significance at the 5% 
level. 
N is the number of observations in each regression. 
 
F.p--‐value is the p--‐value of the F--‐test comparing that regression to an empty model. The 
dependent variable is the standard deviation of growth rates in each period. 
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TABLE    II:    GROWTH    RATE    REGRESSION    RESULTS 
    
 
2007--‐ 
2010  
2000--‐ 
2002  
2003--‐ 
2006  
Constant 1.021E+00 1.038E+00 1.071E+00 
(43.749)  (34.398)  (41.136)  
Secur_act 4.006E--‐03 6.681E--‐03 1.170E--‐03 
(0.964)    (1.235)  (0.241) 
Own_firm 1.008E--‐02 --‐4.628E--‐04 --‐4.142E--‐03 
(1.754) (--‐0.074) (--‐0.825) 
Firm_own_bank 2.101E--‐03 --‐7.091E--‐03 --‐7.354E--‐03 
(0.375)  (--‐1.234)  (--‐1.041) 
Nonbankfin_own_bank.... 8.298E--‐05 6.713E--‐03 3.452E--‐03 
(0.014) (1.043) (0.554) 
ovr_cap_string --‐3.658E--‐04 --‐1.906E--‐03 4.097E--‐04 
(--‐0.145)  (--‐0.588)  (0.167) 
init_cap_strin --‐1.004E--‐02 --‐1.207E--‐03 --‐2.154E--‐03 
(--‐1.978) (--‐0.208) (--‐0.426) 
init_GDP_pcap --‐9.059E--‐07 --‐7.284E--‐08 --‐4.167E--‐07 
(--‐2.783)    (--‐0.191) (--‐1.297) 
 
 
n 56 49 65 
Adjusted R^2 0.2561 --‐0.01158 --‐0.06107 
F--‐t.p--‐value 0.002793 0.5001 0.8495 
 
 
 
Numbers in parenthesis are t--‐values; bolded numbers indicate statistical significance at the 5% 
level. 
N is the number of observations in each regression. 
 
F.p--‐value is the p--‐value of the F--‐test comparing that regression to an empty model. The 
dependent variable is the geometric average of the growth rate index for each period 
(multiply each coefficient by 100 to get percentage point values). 
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TABLE III:    PANEL    DATA REGRESSION    RESULTS  
   
 Std--‐dev    Geo--‐Growth    
Constant 4.8012 1.043E+00 
 4,760  (77.664)  
secur_act --‐0.3987 3.687E--‐03 
 (--‐1.996)    (1.407) 
own_firm --‐0.2689 8.158E--‐04 
 (--‐1.107) (0.259) 
firm_own_bank 0.2719 --‐3.604E--‐03 
 (1.036) (--‐1.082) 
Nonbankfin_own_bank.... --‐0.1710 3.744E--‐03 
 (--‐0.635) (1.086) 
ovr_cap_string --‐0.3432 --‐2.734E--‐04 
 (--‐3.262)    (--‐0.196) 
init_cap_strin 0.1044 --‐4.842E--‐03 
 (0.481) (--‐1.679) 
init_GDP_pcap --‐ --‐5.195E--‐07 
 --‐   (--‐2.173)    
dummy_2003 --‐0.1349 1.230E--‐02 
 (--‐0.330) (2.373)  
dummy_2007 1.1677 --‐7.015E--‐03 
 (2.778)  (--‐1.316) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Adjusted R^2 0.1387 0.1469 
F--‐t.p--‐value 0.00007826 0.00006181 
 
 
Numbers in parenthesis are t--‐values; bolded numbers indicate statistical significance at the 5% 
level. 
N is the number of observations in each regression. 
 
F.p--‐value is the p--‐value of the F--‐test comparing that regression to an empty model. 
Dummy_2003 and dummy_2007 are dummy variables corresponding to the four--‐year 
period starting at the aforementioned years. 
Std--‐dev is the panel data regression ran on standard--‐deviation of the growth rate per period; 
geo--‐growth is the regression ran on the geometric average of the growth rate of each period. 
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TABLE IV:     MODEL    SPECIFICATION    TEST    FOR    THE    STANDARD    DEVIATION    REGRESSION 
 
At The Crisis Period   
 
Restricted         Unrestricted         
Constant 9.1698 9.9214 
(5.057)  (4.695)  
secur_act  ---0.5993  ---0.7151 (---1.678) (---1.764) 
own_firm ---1.0927 ---1.2217 
(---2.220)    (---2.194)    
firm_own_bank  0.5475  0.5285 (1.137) (1.012) 
Nonbankfin_own_bank.... ---1.0989 ---1.0188 
(---2.057)    (---1.810)    
ovr_cap_string ---0.5504 ---0.5504 
(---2.495)    (---2.433)    
init_cap_strin  0.7656  0.8050 (1.764) (1.654) 
court_involve --- ---0.2882 --- (---0.493) 
 
 
df 49 46 
RSS 235.782 232.443 
Adjusted R^2 0.3394 0.3185  
 
F--‐test 0.01436481 < 2.806845 
Failed to reject H0 at the 
95% confidence interval 
 
 
Df is the number of degrees of freedom for each model. 
RSS is the residual sum of squares. 
The null hypothesis under the F--‐test is that the additional independent variables do not 
significantly add to the explanatory power of the model. 
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APPENDIX B: COUNTRY LIST 
 
TABLE V: LIST OF COUNTRIES    INCLUDED    IN    THE    FINAL    REGRESSION    ANALYSIS    
Algeria 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Aruba 
Australia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Canada 
Colombia 
Congo, Rep. 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Dominica 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia 
Gambia, The 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea--‐Bissau 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Hong Kong SAR, China 
Hungary 
Indonesia 
Ireland 
Isle of Man 
Israel 
Italy 
Jordan 
Korea, Rep. 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia, FYR 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Netherlands 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
Spain 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Sweden 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, RB 
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APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF DATA 
TABLE VI: REGULATORY INDICES SUMMARY 
Section I: Banking Activity Regulation 
Indicator Explanation Measure 
secur_act Securities underwriting 
industry 
No restrictions and selling, 
on direct entrance in the 
involvement mutual fund 
insur_act Insurance and selling At least part underwriting 
must be conducted through 
subsidiaries 
Real_act Real Estate Some investment and 
restrictions development 
apply  
Act_restrict Aggregate index Total prohibition 
   
Section II: Financial Conglomeration 
own_firm Whether unrestricted are 
allowed to control non-
financial firms 
Financial Firms 
firm_own_bank Whether non-financial 
firms can own firms 
Requires prior firms 
approval 
non bankfin_own_bank Whether other financial 
firms can own banks 
Limits on ownership apply 
overall_restrict Aggregate index Prohibited 
   
Section III: Competition Regulation 
limit_foreign_bank Degree of limits to entry of 
foreign institutions 
0-4, increasing to 
restrictions 
entr_bank_req Legal requirements bank 
licensing 
0-8, increasing to 
restrictions 
frac_denied Fraction of denied banking 
applications 
Ratio 
frac_dom_den Fraction of domestic denials Ratio 
frac_for_den Fraction of foreign denials Ratio 
   
Section IV: Required Capital 
ovr_cap_string What risk elements are 
reflected in the ratio 
0-7, increasing stringency 
init_cap_strin What classes of assets are 
allowed to be included in 
the required capital reserve 
0-3, increasing stringency 
cap_reg Aggregate index  
   
Section V: Official Supervisory Action 
sup_power What actions can the 
supervisory entity take 
0-14, increasing powers 
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prmpt_corr_pwr Whether there are legally 
required levels of solvency 
that demand automatic 
action 
0-6, increasing promptness 
restruc_pwr Can regulators restructure 
failing institutions 
0-6, increasing powers 
insolv_pwr Can regulators declare 
insolvency of troubled 
institutions 
0-4, increasing powers 
sup_forbear Amount of supervisory 
discretion 
0-4, increasing discretion 
court_involve Independence of regulators 
from the courts 
0-3, decreasing discretion 
loan_class_strin Stringency for degradation 
of classification for overdue 
loans 
Number of days 
prov_strin Provisioning is required 
when classification of a 
loan is degraded 
Percentage 
drivers_index Amount of legally required 
asset diversification for 
banks and if they are 
allowed to borrow from 
abroad 
0-2, increasing 
diversification 
   
Section VI: Supervisory Structure 
sup_tenure Tenure of supervisors Years 
sup_ind_political Independence from political 
influence 
Binary 
sup_ind_fixed Independence from the 
banking industry 
 
sup_ind_fixed Existence of fixed-term 
mandates of at least 4 years 
 
sup_ind_overall Aggregate measure of the 
former 3 variables 
 
multiple_supervisors Multiple regulatory bodies 
for banks 
 
single_multiplesupervisors Single supervisor for the 
entire financial sector 
 
   
Section VII: Private Monitoring 
Cert_audit Requirements of external 
audits 
Binary 
IntRatedBanks_pct Internationally Rated Banks Percentage 
DomRatedBanks_pct (*) Domestically Rated Banks  
Nodepinsure Existence of a formal 
deposit insurance system 
Binary 
BankAccounting How informative banks` 0-4, increasing amount of 
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financial statements are. information 
PrivateMonitoring Aggregate Index  
   
Section VIII: Deposit Insurance 
Depo_insur_pow Institutions` power for 
taking action, or their 
directors 
0-4, insurer increasing 
powers 
Depo_insur_fund Size of the insurance fund 
to total bank assets 
Ratio 
Funding_insured Total deposits covered by 
deposit insurance 
Percentage 
MoralHazard Measures taken to mitigate 
moral hazard 
0-3, increasing mitigation 
   
Section IX: Market Structure 
BankConcentration Concentration of deposits Percentage 
BankConcentration_assets Concentration of assets  
ForeignBanks Foreign-owned Banks  
GovernmentBanks Government-owned Banks  
   
Section X: External Governance 
ExAudit Effectiveness of external 
audits 
0-7, increasing efficacy 
FS_Transparency Transparency of financial 
statements of financial 
institutions 
0-6, increasing transparency 
AccPractices Adoption of internationally 
validated accounting 
practices 
Binary 
ExRating_CreditMonitoring Quality of external ratings 0-5, increasing efficiency 
External_governance_index Aggregate Measure  
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TABLE VII:  DATA    VISUALIZATIONS 
 
 
Histogram of secur_act for the crisis period Histogram of insur_act for the crisis period 
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Histogram of firm_own_bank  for the crisis period 
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Histogram of nonbankfin_own_bank for the crisis period Histogram of ovr_cap_string for the crisis period 
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Histogram of init_cap_string  for the crisis period 
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Histogram of sup_forbear  for the crisis period 
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Histogram of court_involve for the crisis period Histogram of average growth during the crisis 
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Histogram of fluctuation during the crisis 
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